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INTRODUCTION
Today, the words "corporate crime" conjure a picture of
white-collar financial misdealings, of Ivan Boesky and Wall
Street. But there is another trend in corporate criminal liabil-
ity involving increasing numbers of corporations, corporate of-
ficers and corporate employees: violent corporate crime.
Recently, corporations have been charged with and convicted
of crimes of violence against workers arising from working
t Carol L. Bros is an attorney with the Office of General Counsel of 3M. She
holds a B.A. from St. Olaf College, a M.A. from the George Washington University,
and aJ.D. from William Mitchell College of Law. This article is based on a presenta-
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on May 20, 1988 and sponsored by the Minnesota Institute of Legal Education.
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conditions. Not prosecuted under federal or state regulatory
law, these are manslaughter and murder violations under state
criminal statutes. In 1985, an Illinois case caught the nation's
attention. Two officers and an employee of a small company
named Film Recovery Systems were each convicted of murder
and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison and a $10,000 fine
for the cyanide poisoning death of an employee.' While there
have not yet been any corporate homicide prosecutions in Min-
nesota, the possibility exists because of the current state of
Minnesota common law on corporate criminal liability and
Minnesota homicide statutes.2
There are several reasons for this trend toward corporate
criminal liability for workplace fatalities. First, sensitivity and
concern for workers' exposure to workplace hazards are on the
increase. In addition to the Occupational Safety and Health
Act3 (OSHA), "Right-to-Know" legislation has recently been
enacted on the federal level and in a number of states 4 which
requires employers to warn and educate employees about cer-
tain work place hazards. The United States House of Repre-
sentatives is now considering the Corporate Criminal Liability
Act which would institute a system of fines when corporate
managers fail to disclose to employees and the appropriate
federal agencies any "serious concealed danger" which is sub-
ject to federal regulation.5
1. People v. O'Neil, No. 83C- 11091 (Cook County Ill. Cir. Ct. June 15, 1985).
See infra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 159-210 and accompanying text.
3. The Occupational Safety and Health Act [OSHA] includes criminal penalties
in addition to civil penalties. See 29 U.S.C. § 666 (1986). See also infra notes 124-35
and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., OSHA Hazard Communication Standard, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200
(1987). See also MINN. STAT. § 182.655, subd. 10 (1988) (requiring warning labels on
all hazardous substances).
5. CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILrrY AcT OF 1987, H.R. REP. No., 2664, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (June 11, 1987). No parallel bill was filed in the Senate. The House
bill defines "serious concealed danger" as "the normal or reasonably foreseeable use
of, or the exposure of an individual to, such product or business practice as is likely
to cause death or serious bodily injury to an individual (including a sperm, egg, or
fetus in such individual) and the danger is not readily apparent to the average per-
son." Id. Two hearings were held on the bill. The first hearing was held November
19, 1987 by the House Judiciary Subcommittee on CriminalJustice. See Bill on Sanc-
tions Should Bar Pre-Emption of State Actions by Federal Law, Panel Told, 14 O.S.H. Rep.
(BNA) at 979 (Nov. 25, 1987). The second hearing was held January 27, 1988 by the
House Government Operations Subcommittee on Employment. See Statement of the
Associated General Contractors of America (Jan. 27, 1988)(submitted to the Subcommittee
on Employment of the Housing Committee on Government Operations, U.S. House
[Vol. 15
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The second reason for the trend is the failure, or at least the
perceived failure, of OSHA to be effective in enforcing work-
place safety.6 Particularly under the Reagan Administration,
OSHA faced funding restrictions which have constrained its in-
vestigatory abilities. 7 One source states that OSHA safety in-
spections are down forty-percent since 1981.8 Only forty-four
cases have been referred from the Department of Labor to the
Department of Justice for possible criminal prosecution since
OSHA's creation. 9 The Department of Justice has obtained
only two convictions under OSHA's criminal penalties since
1981.10
A third reason for the trend towards corporate criminal ac-
countability is the fact that as corporate criminal law has
evolved it has eliminated the major historical obstacles to cor-
porate criminal liability. " I
This article focuses on corporate criminal liability for homi-
cide based on state criminal law, rather than federal or state
regulatory schemes intended to address job site conditions;
and on corporate homicide stemming from employee deaths
due to work site conditions, rather than deaths due to products
or conditions injurious to third parties. The article reviews the
background of corporate homicide liability for workplace fatal-
ities and some of the significant recent cases in this area; dis-
cusses possible preemption problems between state criminal
remedies and OSHA; surveys the history of corporate criminal
liability in Minnesota and the current Minnesota homicide stat-
utes and concludes that prosecutions against corporations
could take place in Minnesota although due to the inherent
hurdles of bringing this type of case, large numbers of prose-
cutions are unlikely.
of Representatives on H.R. REP. No. 2664, The Corporate Criminal Liability Act of
1987 and The Use of Criminal Penalities for Workplace Safety Violations).
6. See, e.g., Postell, A Criminal Lack of Safety in the Workplace, TRIAL, July 1986, at
121; Special Report: Local Officials Set Up New Programs As Others Urge Caution Over Trend
To Use Criminal Prosecution For Workplace Hazards, 15 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) at 1132 (April
10, 1986); Middleton, Prosecutors Get Tough On Safety, Nat'l LJ., April 21, 1986, at 1,
col. 1.
7. See Note, Corporate Criminal Liability For Workplace Hazards: A Viable Option For
Enforcing Workplace Safety? 52 BROOKLYN L. REV. 183, 204 (1986).
8. See Kahn, When Bad Management Becomes Criminal, INc., March 1987, at 47.
9. See The National Safe Workplace Institute, Ending Legalized Workplace . . .
Homicide Barriers to Job Safety Prosecution in the U.S., July 15, 1988, at 5.
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., infra notes 40-69 and accompanying text.
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I. OVERVIEW OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
FOR HOMICIDE
A. Corporate Criminal Liability
Generally, a corporation may be held liable for the crimes
committed by its, agents. 12 This includes the acts of corporate
officers and managers, as well as rank and file employees. 13
The corporation is accountable based upon an extension of the
doctrine of respondeat superior. 14 Under this doctrine the
acts of the agent will be imputed to the master/corporation if
the agent: (1) commits a crime; (2) while acting within the
scope of the agent's employment; and (3) with the intent to
benefit the corporation. 15
The phrase "acting within the scope of the agent's employ-
ment" has been used broadly and includes actions the agent is
not authorized to commit, but which were committed in con-
nection with the agent's job-related activities.' 6 In some cases,
corporations have been found criminally liable even though
the agent's conduct was specifically prohibited by the corpora-
tion and the corporation took steps to prevent the criminal
conduct. 17
"Intent to benefit the corporation" is also defined broadly.18
The justification for imputing the acts of agents to the corpora-
12. See New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493
(1909). For a thorough discussion of the development of corporate criminal liability,
see K. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY, chs. § 2:01-5:19 (1984) [hereinafter
I BRICKEY]. See also generally Brickey, Corporate Criminal Liability: A P'rimerfor Corporate
Counsel, 40 Bus. LAw. 129 (1984) [hereinafter Brickey, Primer]; Brickey, Corporate Crim-
inal Accountability: A Brief History And An Observation, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 393 (1982)
[hereinafter Brickey, History and Observation]; Elkins, Corporations and the Criminal Law:
An Uneasy Alliance, 65 Ky. L.J. 73 (1976); Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law:
Deterrence, Retribution, Fault, and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1141 (1983); Radin, Cor-
porate Criminal Liability for Employee-Endangering Activities, 18 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS.
39 (1983); Note, Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanc-
tions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227 (1979); 19 CJ.S. Corporations §§ 1358-1363 (1939).
13. I BRICKEY, supra note 12, at § 3:04.
14. See id. at § 3:01. See 10 W. FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAw OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 4942, at 665 (rev. perm. ed. 1986); Note, supra note 12, at 1247;
Brickey, History and Observation, supra note 12, at 415.
15. Note, supra note 12, at 1247.
16. I BRICKEY, supra note 12, at § 3:07; Elkins, supra note 12, at 117-19.
17. See, e.g., Dollar S.S. Co. v. United States, 101 F.2d 638, 640 (9th Cir. 1939)
(company held liable for violation of federal statute even though employee commit-
ting the violation acted in disregard of company policy and management efforts to
enforce policies).
18. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 235 (1957).
[Vol. 15
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tion is that the fictional corporate entity must necessarily act
through its employees and agents. "The power to delegate,
then, is accompanied by a corresponding obligation to provide
sufficient supervision and control to assure that activities con-
ducted on behalf of the corporation and in the corporate name
conform to the requirements of the law."' 9
In addition to corporate liability, corporate officers, employ-
ees and agents may be held personally liable for their criminal
conduct. The corporate entity will not shield a corporation's
officers, employees and agents from personal liability for crim-
inal acts; even when wrongful acts are committed in the course
of employment or when ordered or encouraged by a supervi-
sor.2 0 It is a generally accepted principal that a "servant or
other agent is not relieved from criminal liability for conduct
otherwise a crime because of a command by his principal." 2'
Individuals may be liable for the same offenses as the corpora-
tion: "corporate and individual liability are complementary,
not mutually exclusive."22 In fact, there are cases where the
individual employee has been found not-guilty yet the case
against the corporation has proceeded. 23
In addition, indirect individual actors may be held liable for
aiding and abetting a crime. 24 Managerial-level employees
may be charged with the criminal conduct of lower-level em-
ployees. Instructing another to commit a crime,2 5 aiding an-
19. I BRICKEY, supra note 12, at 56.
20. Id. at § 5:02.
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 359A (1957). Comment A explains that
the ordinary defenses, "such as lack of knowledge and physical coercion to perform
an act, are available, but there are no defenses peculiar to agents." Id.
22. See Note, supra note 12, at 1244.
23. See, e.g., American Medical Ass'n. v. United States, 130 F.2d 233, 252 (D.C.
Cir. 1942), aff'd., 317 U.S. 519 (1943)(court upheld jury verdict finding an associa-
tion guilty while acquitting individual employee defendants).
24. See I BRICKEY, supra note 12, at §§ 5:03-09 (outlining origins of respondeat
superior doctrine; vicarious criminal responsibility or the doctrine of parties to a
crime; nuisance rationale for imputing criminal liability to corporations and to indi-
vidual non-participants and the equitable basis for such liability. Brickey notes that
"passive acquiescence or uncommunicated assent to an unlawful course of conduct
may warrant a finding of encouragement of the conduct by implication"). See also
Note, supra note 12, at 1261 (evaluating strict liability and specific intent as basis for
imposing criminal liability on indirect corporate actors, urging energetic prosecution
of indirect actors as principals to further the criminal justice goals of "deterrence and
just deserts").
25. See United States v. Pellegrimo, 470 F.2d 1205, 1209 n.4 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
1989]
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other to commit a crime,2 6 and even silently acquiescing to
criminal conduct 27 may give rise to personal liability. If corpo-
rate officials commit or assist another in committing a crime,
the law will not allow them to escape liability simply because
they have used the company as the vehicle for their offending
acts. 28
The rationale for corporate criminal liability incorporates es-
sentially the same social aims as all criminal liability: deter-
rence, retribution and rehabilitation. 29  Of these three,
deterrence is the primary justification for imposing criminal
sanctions on corporations and their agents.30 Sending a cor-
poration to jail is impossible, thus, corporate deterrence
should occur through fines and the social stigma associated
with the criminal prosecution of the corporation and its
agents.31 There is significant debate regarding the effective-
ness of these sanctions.3 2 Can a fine be sufficient deterrent to a
corporation that daily must assess the financial consequences
denied, 411 U.S. 918 (1973) (one wilfully causing interstate transportation is punish-
able as principal). See also BRICKEY, Primer, supra note 12, at 139-40.
26. See, e.g., United States v. Andreadis, 366 F.2d 423, 429-30 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1001 (1967) (president of advertising agency reviewed and approved
ads containing false weight reduction claims, company was not insulated from
liability).
27. See, e.g., Moreland v. State, 165 Ga. 467, 139 S.E. 77, 79 (1927) (em-
ployer/passenger failed to protest when his chauffeur violated the speed limit, held
liable for chauffeur's collision with another car, killing a woman).
28. Id. at 105. See State v. McBride, 215 Minn. 123, 9 N.W.2d 416 (1943)(officer
or agent of corporation cannot avoid responsibilty for actions on grounds it was done
in official capacity); see also infra notes 166-77 and accompanying text.
29. See Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193
(1985); Comment, The Economic Inefficiency of Corporate Criminal Liability, 73 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 582 (1982); Comment, Corporate Criminal Liabilityfor Homicide: Has the
Fiction Been Extended Too Far? 4J.L. & CoM. 95, 118 (1984). See generally Note, Decision-
making Models and the Control of Corporate Crime, 85 YALE L.J. 1091 (1976).
30. See Radin, supra note 12, at 54-55; Fisse, supra note 12, at 1146.
31. See Comment, Corporate Liability, supra note 29, at 118; Note, supra note 7, at
221.
32. For an in-depth discussion on the theories and effectiveness of corporate
criminal sanctions, see generally Fisse, supra note 12. See also generally B. FiSSE & J.
BRAITHWAITE, THE IMPACT OF PUBLICITY ON CORPORATE OFFENDERS (1983); Coffee,
"No Soul To Damm, No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry Into The Problem of Corpo-
rate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386 (1981); Coffee, Corporate Crime and Punishment: A
Non-Chicago View of the Economics of Criminal Sanctions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 419 (1980);
Coleman, Is Corporate Criminal Liability Really Necessary? 29 Sw.L.J. 908 (1975); Geis,
Criminal Penalties for Corporate Criminals, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 377 (1972); Note, supra note
7, at 221; Comment, Corporate Liability, supra note 29, at 118-20. Sheran, The Case of
the Criminal Corporation, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1989, at 12E, col. 1.
[Vol. 15
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of its actions or will it merely be viewed as a cost of doing busi-
ness? 33 Proponents urge that negative public reaction to crim-
inal charges or convictions may be a stronger deterrent than a
purely economic penalty because of the ensuing long-term ef-
fects on the corporation's ability to turn a profit. The corpora-
tion will presumably try to regain its good public image by
quickly eliminating the "dishonor" and preventing future
stigmatization.
34
The questionable effectiveness of the deterrent value of gen-
eral corporate criminal liability is another reason to hold cor-
porate officers, employees and agents personally liable instead
of the corporation. Individuals may be subject to both fines
and imprisonment. Additionally, the deterrent value of a so-
cial stigma may be most effective against corporate officers and
managers, who are frequently well-known in their communi-
ties. 35 One prosecutor stated, "When human life can be re-
duced to the cost of doing business, something's got to give.
And believe me, one company officer spending two days in jail
is worth any fine you can impose [against the organization].
When you lock that cell door, word gets around an industry
real fast." 36 Rehabilitation and retribution may also be more
effective when imposed on the individual actor rather than the
corporate entity.
Another issue raised by criminal prosecutions of corpora-
tions is the fact that corporate criminal liability and its penal-
ties necessarily impact the shareholders of the corporation.
Authorities dispute whether the penalty actually deters corpo-
rate criminal actors or simply harms innocent shareholders.
On the one hand, imposition of fines would prevent the unjust
enrichment of shareholders profiting from corporate criminal
conduct.3 7 On the other hand, shareholders are typically inno-
cent, or at least less-culpable for corporate crimes because
"[i]n most cases, the shareholders not only have not partici-
pated in the criminal conduct, but also lack the practical means
33. See Radin, supra note 12, at 56.
34. Note, supra note 7, at 222-23; but cf. Comment, Corporate Liability, supra note
29, at 119 (effectiveness of social stigma as deterrent is questionable).
35. Radin, supra note 12, at 56-59; Note, supra note 7, at 223.
36. Kahn, supra note 8, at 47 (quoting John Lynch, Environmental
Crimes/OSHA Division, Los Angeles, California).
37. See, e.g., Comment, Corporate Liability, supra note 29, at 117.
19891
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of supervising the corporation's management."38
Despite the continuing debates on the effectiveness of the
sanctions for corporate criminal liability, the concept that cor-
porate entities may be held responsible for the criminal actions
of their officers, agents, and employees is firmly implanted in
the law.
B. Corporate Liability for Homicide
Imposing corporate criminal liability for workplace fatalities
raises special problems. First, the fact situation must fit the
standards for imputing criminal conduct of a corporate agent
to the corporate entity. In the case of homicide, this may be
significantly more difficult than in financial crimes or crimes of
non-compliance with regulations. Was the corporate agent
acting within the scope of his or her employment in commit-
ting the crime? Did the corporate agent commit the crime with
the intent to benefit the corporation? Second, it must be de-
termined whether a corporation is a "person" under state
criminal statutes for the purposes of obtaining indictments and
convictions against corporations. Finally, for degrees of homi-
cide that require criminal or specific intent, it must be decided
whether a corporation can form the necessary intent requisite
to conviction. There are relatively few reported cases regard-
ing corporate liability for homicide. 39 All of the cases grapple
38. Radin, supra note 12, at 52. See also Fisse, supra note 12, at 1173-76; Com-
ment, Corporate Liability, supra note 29, at 121-22 (holding innocent shareholders re-
sponsible is a perversion of criminal justice system).
For a discussion of some other implications of corporate criminal liability, in-
cluding issues of corporate defenses, corporate indemnification and insurance, and
privileges that may apply to internal investigations, see generally, Yohay & Dodge,
Criminal Prosecutions For Occupational Injuries. An Issue of Growing Concern, 13 EMPLOYEE
REL. LJ. 197 (1987); Note, Organizational Papers And the Privilege Against Self-Incrimina-
tion, 99 HARV. L. REV. 640 (1986); Note, Fifth Amendment Privilege For Producing Corpo-
rate Documents, 84 MIcH. L. REV. 1544 (1986).
39. There are just sixteen reported cases concerning corporate liability for homi-
cide. Of the sixteen cases, only nine survived pre-trial motions. Compare United
States v. Van Schaick, 134 F. 592, 593 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1904)(owner of vessel held lia-
ble for manslaughter in violation of statute requiring life preservers on board); Gran-
ite Const. Co. v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3, 4 (1983)(company indictment for
manslaughter upheld for deaths of seven workers at power plant under construction);
Commonwealth v. Fortner LP Gas Co., 610 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980)(indict-
ments upheld against corporation charged with manslaughter in death of child
caused by company-owned truck with grossly defective brakes); State v. Lehigh Valley
R.R. Co., 103 A. 682 (N.J. 1917)(company indictment for manslaughter upheld);
People v. Deitsch, 470 N.Y.S. 2d 158, 158-59 (1983)(indictment reinstated against
[Vol. 15
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with one or all of these issues.
1. Statutory Interpretation: Is a Corporation a Person?
A primary barrier to corporate criminal liability for homicide
is the definition of homicide under state common law and
criminal statutes.40 A number of states define homicide as the
killing of one human being by another.4 1 In these states, the
courts must then determine whether the term "another" ap-
plies to corporate entities or only to natural persons. In other
states, corporate entities fall within the definition of "person"
under criminal homicide statutes. 42 Such a designation allows
these states discretion as to whether corporations may be crim-
inally liable for homicide.
corporation charged with second degree manslaughter); Commonwealth v. Penn Val-
ley Resorts, Inc., 494 A.2d 1139, 1139-40 (Pa. 1985)(corporation held liable for in-
voluntary manslaughter); Commonwealth v. McIlwain School Bus Lines, 423 A.2d
413, 423 (Pa. 1980)(corporation may be held liable for criminal homicide by vehicle);
Vaughan & Sons, Inc, v. State, 649 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983), rev'd, 737
S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Crim. Ct. App. 1987), af'd, 750 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. Ct. App.
1988)(corporation held criminally negligent because corporation is "person" under
Texas statute); with Commonwealth v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 153 S.W. 459, 460 (Ky.
1913)(absent a specific state statute, a corporation cannot be held liable for involun-
tary manslaughter); People v. Hegedus, 169 Mich. App. 62, 425 N.W.2d 729
(1988)(charge of involuntary manslaughter in employee death from carbon monox-
ide intoxication dismissed due to criminal prosecution preempted by OSHA); People
v. Warner-Lambert Co., 51 N.Y.2d 295, 414 N.E.2d 660 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1031 (1981) (second degree manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide indict-
ments against corporation and officers dismissed because cause of factory explosion
that killed six employees was unforeseeable and unforeseen); People v. Ebasco Servs.
Inc., 77 Misc. 2d 784, 354 N.Y.S.2d 807 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974)(two corporations and
individuals charged with criminally negligent homicide in cofferdam collapse that
killed two construction workers, indictment failed because not sufficiently precise to
apprise defendants of conduct subject to indictment); People v. Rochester Ry. &
Light Co., 195 N.Y. 102, 88 N.E. 22 (1909)(indictment dismissed because corpora-
tion not a "person" under N.Y. Penal code); State v. Pacific Powder Co., 360 P,2d
530, 532 (Or. 1961)(manslaughter indictment dismissed because "person" did not
include a corporation) and Commonwealth v. Punxsutawney St. Passenger Ry. Co.,
24 Pa. 25 (1899)(corporation cannot be criminally liable for manslaughter); Sabine
Consolidated, Inc. v. State, 756 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988)(corporate and indi-
vidual defendants' convictions for negligent homicide for employee death from
trench cave-in reversed by holding that state criminal charges preempted by OSHA).
40. Statutory interpretation presents a definitional obstacle to corporate homi-
cide liability. Brickey, Death in the Workplace: Corporate Liability for Criminal Homicide, 2
NOTRE DAMEJ.L., ETHICS & PUB. POL'y. 753, 757 (1987).
41. See Annotation, Corporations' Criminal Liability for Homicide, 45 A.L.R.4TH 1021,
1024 (1986)(discussion of state and federal cases in which the courts have addressed
the issue of whether a corporation may be subject to criminal liability for homicide).
42. Id. at 1026-30. See also, Comment, Corporate Liability, supra note 29, at 100-05
(discussion of the law in New York, New Jersey, Kentucky and Oregon).
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A case that exemplifies the broadening of homicide liability
of the corporate entity is People v. Ebasco Services, Inc.43  In
Ebasco, a New York court found that a corporation could com-
mit homicide, though it could not be a victim of homicide.
44
The defendants included two corporations and three individu-
als charged with criminally negligent homicide for the deaths
of two workers at a construction site.45 The defendants' con-
tracting company was hired to construct an' extension for an
electrical generating station. The project required that a cof-
ferdam be constructed in the East River so that a portion of the
facility could be installed. The cofferdam collapsed killing the
two construction workers.
The Ebasco decision relied on portions of the New York
homicide statute which allowed an interpretation that a corpo-
ration could be a person. One section provided, "A person is
guilty of criminally negligent homicide when, with criminal
negligence, he causes the death of another person." 46 Under
the statute the term "person" is defined as "a human being
who has been born and is alive." 47 The statute also stated that,
"where appropriate, a public or private corporation" may be
included under the statute.48 Consequently, the court held
that the definition of the victim of a homicide as a human being
did not preclude the corporation from being the perpetrator of
the homicide. 49 The court also found "no manifest impropri-
ety" in including a corporate entity as a person under the gen-
eral definitional statute and held that "although a corporation
cannot be the victim of a homicide, it may commit that offense
and be answerable therefor."
50
A contrary ruling was initially made by the Texas Court of
43. 77 Misc. 2d 784, 354 N.Y.S.2d 807 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974).
44. Id. at 788, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 817.
45. Id. at 785, 354 N.Y.S. 2d at 809. The parties included the contractor, sub-
contractor, an officer of the subcontractor and two employee-supervisors of the
contractor.
46. Id. at 786, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 810 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.10 (McKinney
1967)).
47. Id. (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05[l]).
48. Id. at 787, 354 N.Y.S. 2d at 811 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(7)).
49. Ebasco, 77 Misc. 2d at 788, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 812.
50. Id. at 787, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 811. However, the court found the indictments to
be lacking and dismissed them. See also, Granite Constr. Co. v. Superior Court, 149
Cal. App. 3d 465, 467, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3 (1983) (relying on California statutory defini-
tion of "person" as including a corporation, allowing corporation to be charged with
manslaughter in the deaths of seven construction workers).
[Vol. 15
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Appeals in Vaughan & Sons, Inc. v. State,5' a case in which a cor-
poration was charged with criminally negligent homicide when
corporate employees caused the death of two individuals in a
motor vehicle collision. The Texas statute, like the New York
statute, defined a person to include a corporation. 52 In Texas,
a person commits criminally negligent homicide when they
"cause . . . the death of an individual by criminal negli-
gence." 53 The Vaughan court acknowledged that a "superficial
reading" of the statute could lead to the finding that a corpora-
tion could be liable for criminally negligent manslaughter, but
phrased the question before it as "whether a legislative intent
plainly appears which includes corporations within the crimi-
nal field of negligent homicide by the use of the term 'per-
son'." 54 The court found that, because the statute grouped
51. 649 S.W.2d 677, 678 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983), rev'd, 737 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1987), aff'd, 750 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988). The Texas Court of Appeals
stated:
A superficial reading of the negligent homicide statute construed with the
Penal Code Definitions of 'person' indicates that a corporation could be
found guilty of the crime charged. But the actual question before the court
is whether a legislative intent plainly appears which includes corporations
within the criminal field of negligent homicide by the use of the term 'per-
son' . . . . Therefore, without a stronger clearer indication from the legisla-
ture that the policy for holding corporations criminally responsible for
homicide has changed, we decline to so hold. We should make haste slowly
when it is in the direction of holding either an individual or a corporation
criminally liable for a crime, especially one so serious as homicide, when it is
committed by someone other than the person charged.
Id. at 678-79.
In reversing the Texas Court of Appeals, the Texas Criminal Court of Appeals
noted:
An examination of decisional law from other states indicates that where
there are corporate criminal responsibility statutes similar to our own Texas
statutes, it appears to have been consistently held liable for specific intent
crimes and offenses of criminal negligence .... Given the history of corpo-
rate criminal liability in Texas prior to the 1974 Penal Code, the various
provisions of the 1974 Penal Code and other statutes enacted to bring about
change, the clear statutory language, and the analogous case authority, we
reject the reasoning of the court of appeals and conclude that a corporation
may be criminally prosecuted for the misdemeanor code offense of crimi-
nally negligent homicide under V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 1907 for corpora-
tions have been made subject thereto.
Id. at 812-14.
But see State v. Pacific Power Co., 266 Or. 502, 504, 360 P.2d 530, 532
(196 1)(corporation held not a "person" under involuntary manslaughter statute
where corporation's truck loaded with explosives and left unattended, exploded kill-
ing a bystander).
52. See Vaughan, 649 S.W.2d at 677 (citing TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07 (a)(27)
(Vernon 1974)).
53. Id. at 677-78 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.07 (a)).
54. Id. at 678.
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homicide and criminally negligent homicide together in one
section of the statute, and in Texas, corporations could not be
liable for specific intent crimes, the intent of the legislature was
not clear. 55 The court, therefore, dismissed the indictments.
On appeal, however, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
overturned the decision. 56 The appellate court based its deci-
sion on the standards for determining legislative intent, using
reasoning similar to that of the Ebasco court.5
7
2. Intent
Historically, courts have been willing to hold corporations
liable for negligent homicide but have never held a corpora-
tion liable for homicide that requires specific criminal intent. 58
One rationale for this is that a corporation is an artificial being
and "has no hands with which to strike." 59 How can this artifi-
cial being form the requisite criminal intent?
The earliest cases finding corporate criminal liability for
homicide concerned corporate violations of statutes and regu-
lations where no intent was required, that the violation oc-
curred was enough. For example, in United States v. Van
55. Id. at 678-79. See also generally Annotation, supra note 43, at 1026-30. Previ-
ously, Kentucky, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania and Texas refused to permit the
prosecution of a corporation for homicide on the basis that the common law and
statutory definitions of the crime applied only to human beings or natural persons.
Recently, however, Kentucky and New York joined California, Pennsylvania and New
Jersey in permitting the prosecution of a corporation for homicide. These jurisdic-
tions now hold that a corporation is included as a "person" within the common law
and statutory definition of homicide.
56. Annotation, supra note 43, at 811.
57. "Since no definition of 'person' as applied to the actual committing of the
homicide has been included by the Legislature in the homicide article, the court must
look to the broader definition of 'person' contained in the overall definitional article
of the Penal Law." Vaughan, 737 S.W.2d 805, 811 (Tx. Crim. App. 1987)(quoting
People v. Ebasco Services, Inc., 77 Misc. 2d 784, 787, 354 N.Y.S. 2d 807, 811 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1974)).
Both the Vaughan and Ebasco courts rejected the statutory construction argument
which would prohibit corporate criminal liability for homicide due to inability to form
intent. The courts held instead that since corporations are subject to criminal codes
generally, they may be held liable under them, even for homicide. Vaughan, 737
S.W.2d at 814; Ebasco, 77 Misc. 2d at 788, 354 N.Y.S. 2d at 812.
58. See United States v. Van Schaick, 134 F. 592, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1904)(corpora-
tion found negligent in drowning deaths of 900 passengers on corporate vessel which
sank, deaths due to faulty life preservers). Cf Annotation, Corporation's Criminal Lia-
bility for Homicide, 83 A.L.R.2o 1117, 1118-19 (1962).
59. BRICKEY, History and Observation, supra note 12, at 411.
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Schaick 60 the court upheld the indictments of a steamship com-
pany and its officers and directors for furnishing defective life
preservers in violation of a federal statute requiring adequate
life preservers on all steamships. Nine hundred people
drowned when a company ship caught fire and the life preserv-
ers failed. The corporation moved to quash the indictment on
the grounds that the corporation could not be charged or con-
victed of the crime of manslaughter. The court held that be-
cause the statute made the owner liable for death through a
violation of the law, the corporation could not be exempt from
liability simply because it was a corporation. The applicable
statute did not require malice or intent in order for liability to
apply.
6 1
Corporations have been held responsible for crimes other
than homicide which require specific and criminal intent.62
Although a corporate entity cannot have a "culpable mental
state" per se, 63 courts have imputed the intent of the individual
officer, employee or agent to the corporation. 64
In addition, vicarious liability requires that an agency rela-
tionship exist between the corporation and the agent. The
60. 134 F. 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1904).
61. Id. at 608. See also Comment, Corporate Criminal Liability for Homicide: The Con-
troversy Flames Anew, 17 CAL. W.L. REV. 465, 470-71 (1981)(discussion of Van Schaic
which notes that courts are more willing to charge a corporation with criminal liabil-
ity if the crime involves negligence, rather than specific criminal intent).
62. See, e.g., New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S.
481, 494-95 (1909) (common carrier corporation held liable for acts of freight traffic
manager who had authority to establish transportation rates when manager author-
ized illegal rebates, because there is "no good reason why corporations may not be
held responsible for and charged with the knowledge and purpose of their agents,
acting within the authority conferred upon them"); United States v. Carter, 311 F.2d
934, 941-42 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied sub nom., Felice v. United States, 373 U.S. 915
(1963)(brewery held liable for crime committed by officer of company in making an
unlawful payment of money to president and general manager of union because "a
corporation, through the conduct of its agents and employees, may be convicted of a
crime, including a crime involving knowledge and wilfulness").
For a full discussion of the history and development of corporate liability for
crimes requiring specific intent, see generally Fisse, supra note 12, at 1183-213. The
discussion concludes that "[a]lthough few corporations operate under policies of
noncompliance, all can be placed on notice that they are expected, as a matter of
specific reactive policy, to respond to an actus reus by formulating and implementing a
satisfactory program of preventative or corrective reaction." Id. at 1213 (footnote
omitted).
63. See I BRICKEY, supra note 12, at §§ 4:01-4:05, at 81-109; Comment, supra
note 60, at 467.
64. See I BRICKEY, supra note 12, at §§ 4:01-4:05, at 81-109.
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agent must be acting within the scope of his or her employ-
ment with intent to benefit the corporation. 65 The first re-
ported case affirming vicarious corporate liability for a crime
involving specific intent is New York Central & Hudson River Rail-
road v. United States.66 In New York Central, the railroad company
was indicted for granting illegal rebates. The Supreme Court
wrote:
Since a corporation acts by its officers and agents their pur-
poses, motives, and intent are just as much those of the cor-
poration as are the things done. If, for example, the
invisible, intangible essence of air, which we term a corpora-
tion, can level mountains, fill up valleys, lay down iron
tracks, and run railroad cars on them, it can intend to do it,
and can act therein as well viciously as virtuously.
67
The court continued:
Applying the principal governing civil liability, we go only a
step farther in holding that the act of the agent, while exer-
cising the authority delegated . . . may be controlled, in the
interest of public policy, by imputing his act to his employer
and imposing penalties upon the corporation for which he
is acting in the premises.
68
Courts now generally accept that the intent of individual cor-
porate actors may be imputed to corporations. 69 One com-
mentator writes:
[A]lthough crimes against persons are not traditionally
viewed as being linked to the profit motive in the same way
as crimes against property, the courts will no longer over-
look the substantial indirect economic benefit that may ac-
crue to the corporation through crimes against the person.
To get these indirect economic benefits, for example, the
corporate management may shortcut expensive safety pre-
cautions, respond forcibly to strikes, or engage in criminal
anticompetitive behavior. If any such risk-taking is a corpo-
rate action, the corporation becomes a proper criminal
defendant. 7
0
In crimes of violence, however, meeting the standards for
imputing an agent's conduct to the corporation is more diffi-
65. Id. at § 4:01, at 82.
66. 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
67. Id. at 492-93 (quoting BisHops NEW CRIMINAL LAW § 417 (8th ed. 1892)).
68. Id. at 494.
69. FLETCHER, supra note 14, § 4944, at 675.
70. Id.
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cult than in regulatory or financial crimes. For example, in Peo-
ple v. Rochester Railway & Light Co.,71 the corporation was
indicted for homicide. The court found that, within limits, a
corporation could be convicted of crimes requiring an element
of intent. The court also stated, however, that crimes which
require "personal, malicious intent and acts so ultra vires that
a corporation manifestly could not commit them," 72 would
limit imputation of criminal intent to the corporate entity. In
this type of case, therefore, it is more likely to have individual
corporate actors indicted than the corporate entity itself.
In recent years potential corporate liability has arisen out of
three basic scenarios: deaths to third parties from products
manufactured by the corporation; deaths to third parties due
to conditions created by corporations or corporate actions;
and deaths to corporate employees due to work site
conditions.
Perhaps the best known corporate homicide prosecution for
the design and manufacture of a product was against the Ford
Motor Company. Ford was prosecuted for the design and
manufacture of the Ford Pinto, a product which caused the
death of three teenagers. 73 Ford was charged with three
counts of reckless homicide when the teenagers died in a fire
allegedly caused by a defective gas tank in the Pinto.74 The
state claimed that Ford knowingly manufactured the defective
tank, and had failed to warn Pinto owners of the danger and to
remedy the problem. 75 The jury acquitted Ford on all three
counts. 76
Corporations have also been subject to homicide liability
71. 195 N.Y. 102, 88 N.E. 22 (1909).
72. 195 N.Y. at 103, 88 N.E. at 23 (citing WHARTON'S CRIM. LAw § 91 (9th ed.
1885); see Morawetz, PRIVATE CORP. § 732 (2d. ed. 1886).
73. State v. Ford Motor Co., No. 5324 (Indiana Super. Ct., filed Sept. 13, 1978),
noted in 47 U.S.L.W. 2178 (1978). See generally Maakestad, A Historical Survey of Corpo-
rate Homicide in the United States: Could It Be Prosecuted In Illinois?, ILL. B. J. 772
(1981)(article surveys the key cases which consider the issue of corporate homicide,
including the Ford Pinto case); Comment, supra note 60; Note, Corporate Homicide: A
New Assault On Corporate Decision-Making, 54 NOTRE DAME L.REv. 911 (1979).
74. State v. Ford Motor Co., No. 5324 (Indiana Super. Ct., filed Sept. 13, 1978)
noted in 47 U.S.L.W. at 2178 (1978).
75. Id.
76. See Stoner, Corporate Criminal Liability for Homicide: Can the Criminal Law Control
Corporate Behavior, 38 Sw. L.J. 1275, 1285, n.108 (1985). The comment discusses
corporate criminal liability for homicide, including the Ford Pinto case. It also in-
cludes a discussion on new developments in the law since the Pinto case, by focusing
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when the corporation creates conditions or takes actions which
cause death to third parties. Several cases deal with corporate
agents driving corporate vehicles in a manner which causes the
death of bystanders. 77 In Commonwealth v. Fortner LP Gas Co. ,78
the corporation was charged with manslaughter for the death
of a child. 79 The child was killed by a company-owned vehicle,
with grossly defective brakes driven by an employee.
80
Corporate homicide charges have also been brought when
corporations create other types of conditions which cause
death. For instance, in State v. Six Flags Corp. ,st a grand jury in
New Jersey indicted Six Flags Corporation for aggravated
manslaughter after eight people were killed at a corporate-op-
erated amusement park.82 Two officers of the company also
were charged with manslaughter. The deaths occurred after a
youth accidentally started a fire by touching a cigarette lighter
to a foam rubber padded wall inside the amusement park's
haunted house. The wall was covered with a highly flammable
type of foam rubber. The grand jury believed the use of that
type of foam rubber indicated the corporation's reckless disre-
gard for human life.83 Charges against the two individual de-
on the then recent indictment of the Six Flags Corporation and two of its officers in
connection with the deaths of eight teenagers killed in a fire. Id. at 1285.
For a case in which a corporation was charged for negligently installing its prod-
uct, a gas apparatus that leaked and killed a bystander, see People v. Rochester Ry. &
Light Co., 59 Misc. 347, 112 N.Y.S. 362 (1908), aff'd, 129 N.Y. App. Div. 843, 114
N.Y.S. 755 (1909), aft'd, 195 N.Y. 102, 88 N.E. 22 (N.Y. 1909)(although the court
accepted that a corporation could commit manslaughter, the indictment was dis-
missed because of the definition of homicide under the relevant statute).
77. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fortner LP Gas Co., 610 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1980)(six year old child killed when crossing highway after getting off school
bus, truck with defective brakes was unable to stop); Commonwealth v. McIlavain
School Bus Lines, 283 Pa. Super 1,423 A.2d 413 (1980)(child got off school bus and
was walking in front of it when she was run over); Vaughan & Sons, Inc. v. State, 649
S.W.2d 677 (Tx. Ct. App. 1983), rev'd, 737 S.W.2d 805 (Tx. Crim. App. 1987) aff'd,
750 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988)(death of two people in motor vehicle collision).
78. 610 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
79. Id.
80. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Penn Valley Resorts, Inc., 343 Pa. Super. 387,
494 A.2d 1139 (1985)(actions of "high managerial agent" of corporation can lead to
criminal corporate liability for involuntary manslaughter when he served alcohol to
intoxicated minor who was killed in auto accident).
81. No. 65,084 (Ocean City, N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div., indictment filed Sept. 14,
1984).
82. See generally Stoner, supra note 75 at 1285. Stoner notes that the indictment
makes only the second such case in the state's history and cautions that even if a
conviction resulted, the efficacy of corporate criminal liability is questionable.
83. Id.
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fendants were later dismissed when they were admitted into a
pretrial intervention program; the corporation was later
acquitted.8
4
Most recently, corporate homicide liability has been im-
posed for work site-caused fatalities; this is at a time when an
estimated 10,700 men and women die each year at work or die
due to work-related injuries,8 5 and the number of workplace
fatalities and injuries is on the rise.8 6 Although OSHA fines for
regulatory violations have increased,8 7 there appears to be a
gap between the ability of OSHA officials to protect workers
on the job and the needs of workers for protection. This need
is highlighted by egregious situations like that in the Film Re-
covery Systems case.88 The gap between regulatory protection
and workers' needs becomes apparent when a comparison is
made between the penalties assessed against companies and
corporate agents for homicide with the penalties assessed by
OSHA. In the Film Recovery Systems case, for example, three
individual defendants were sentenced to twenty-five years in
prison and each assessed fines of $10,000.89 In contrast, the
company received citations for twenty OSHA violations and a
fine of $4,844, which was later cut in half.90 Given this appar-
ent ineffectiveness of OSHA to address workplace fatalities, lo-
cal prosecutors in several parts of the country have stepped in
to close the gap with criminal proceedings.
II. THE CURRENT WAVE OF CORPORATE HOMICIDE CASES
A. The Film Recovery Systems Case
The current wave of cases involving corporate homicide for
workplace fatalities began with the 1985 Film Recovery Sys-
tems case, 91 the first case convicting and sentencing corporate
84. See Caiazza v. Bally Mfg. & Six Flags Corp., 210 NJ. Super. 7, 509 A.2d 187,
189 (1986)(civil suit for wrongful death against Six Flags, referencing disposition of
the criminal charges).
85. See The National Safe Workplace Institute, supra note 9, at 1.
86. Id. (quoting John B. Moran former Director of Safety Research, National In-
stitute of Occupational Safety and Health, in his testimony before the Committee on
Labor and Human Resources, 101 Cong., 2d Sess. (1988)).
87. See Kinney, Weak OSHA Enforcement Hiding Behind Big Times, 1988 Safety &
Health Voice, at 1.
88. See infra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
89. The National Safe Workplace Institute, supra note 9, at 2.
90. Id. at 2, 21.
91. People v. O'Neil, No. 83C- 11091 (Cook County Ill. Cir. Ct. June 15, 1985).
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officers and employees for murder. The case arose from the
cyanide-poisoning death of an undocumented immigrant em-
ployee for which the corporation itself, a former president of
the company, two officers, the plant manager and a plant fore-
man were indicted.
92
Film Recovery Systems, Incorporated, was in the business of
recovering silver from used x-ray and photographic film. Vats
of cyanide were used as part of the recovery process.93 On
February 10, 1983, one employee collapsed and died from cya-
nide poisoning. On investigation, the following evidence was
gathered and produced at trial: the company failed to provide
employees proper safety equipment; no emission-control de-
vices were installed over the cyanide vats; there was no moni-
toring of the level of cyanide gas in the plant; workers and
visitors regularly complained of work-related health problems
such as feeling nauseous and dizzy; the defendants knew that
cyanide was used in the plant and could be fatal; the company
systematically hired non-English speaking and undocumented
immigrants, perhaps to reduce the likelihood of complaints re-
garding working conditions; and the defendants may have con-
cealed the extent of the danger from employees. 94 In fact, one
witness reported seeing company officials remove the skull and
crossbones labels from cyanide containers.95 The former pres-
ident, plant manager and plant foreman were each convicted
of murder and fourteen counts of reckless conduct; the corpo-
ration was convicted of fourteen counts of reckless conduct.
96
This flagrant disregard for the health and safety of the em-
ployees led to the murder indictments and convictions, and
brought the trial judge to compare the actions of the company
to those of a terrorist who "leaves a time bomb ticking in a
public place." 9
7
92. Verdict May Spur Industrial Probes, Nat'il L.J. July 1, 1985, at 3, col. 2. See also
National Safe Workplace Institute, supra, note 9, at 2.
93. See Brickey, supra note 40, at 770.
94. See id. at 768-75; Kahn, supra note 8, at 47.
95. Brickey, supra note 40, at 773-74.
96. See Nat'l LJ., supra note 91, at 3, col. 2 to 8, col. 3. For additional discussion
of this case, see also S. HILLS, CORPORATE VIOLENCE: INJURY AND DEATH FOR PROFIT,
Chp. 8 (S. Hills ed. 1987); Gibson, A Worker's Death Spurs Murder Trial, Nat'l L.J., May
20, 1985, at 6, col. 1; Kahn, supra note 8, at 47; Note, supra note 7, at 218-19; Brickey,
Workplace, supra note 40.
97. Kahn, supra note 8, at 47 (quoting trial judge Ronald J.P. Banks).
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B. Post-Film Recovery Systems Cases
The Film Recovery Systems case generated national press at-
tention and sparked. a critical review by the legal community of
the handling of corporate homicide liability. 98 Since 1985, cor-
porate homicide charges for workplace fatalities have in-
creased. However, at present, there are still only a handful of
reported corporate homicide cases involving workplace fatali-
ties.99 In no case has a corporation been convicted of murder,
and in only the Film Recovery Systems case have the charges
against corporate agents included murder. In only three cases
have corporate officers or employees been sentenced to
prison. 100 In all of the cases, aggravating circumstances sur-
rounding the fatality have been present.
98. See, e.g., Brickey, supra note 40; Kahn, supra note 8, at 46; Miller, Murder in the
Workplace, BENCH & BAR OF MINN., March 1986, at 24; Postell, Trends: A Criminal Lack
of Safety in the Workplace, TRIAL, July 1986, at 121; Yohay & Dodge, supra note 38, at
37; A Death At Work Can Put The Boss In Jail, Bus. WK., March 2, 1987, at 37 [hereinaf-
ter Death at Work]; Special Report, supra note 6, at 1132; Note, supra note 7; Middleton,
supra note 6, at 1, col. 1.
99. See Granite Const. Co. v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3, 9, 149 Cal. App.
3d 465, 474 (1983)(company's indictment for manslaughter upheld for deaths of
seven workers at power plant under construction); People v. Hegedus, 169 Mich.
App. 62, 425 N.W.2d 729 (1988)(charge of involuntary manslaughter in employee
death from carbon monoxide intoxication dismissed due to criminal prosecution pre-
empted by OSHA); People v. Warner-Lambert Co., 51 N.Y.2d 295, 305, 414 N.E.2d
660, 665 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981)(second degree manslaughter and
criminally negligent homicide indictments against corporation and officers dismissed
because cause of factory explosion that killed six employees was unforeseeable and
unforeseen); People v. Deitsch, 470 N.Y.S.2d 158, 165, 97 A.D.2d 327, 337
(1983)(indictment reinstated against corporation and individuals charged with sec-
ond degree manslaughter in death of employee in warehouse fire where emergency
exits blocked by materials); People v. Ebasco Services, Inc., 77 Misc. 2d 784, 788, 354
N.Y.S.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974)(two corporations and individuals charged
with criminally negligent homicide in cofferdam collapse that killed two construction
workers, though corporation may be guilty of homicide, here indictments failed);
Vaughan & Sons, Inc. v. State, 649 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983), rev'd, 737
S.W.2d 805, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), aff'd, 750 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988)
(corporation charged with criminally negligent homicide for causing death of two
people in vehicle collision, held crime may be committed by corporation and a corpo-
ration is a "person" under Texas statute); Sabine Consolidated, Inc. v. State, 756
S.W.2d 865 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (corporate and individual defendants' convictions
in employee death from trench cave-in reversed by holding that state criminal prose-
cution preempted by OSHA); State ex rel. Cornellier v. Black, 144 Wis. 2d 745, -,
425 N.W.2d 21, 22 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988)(homicide charge for reckless conduct up-
held against officer/operator of fireworks plant in death of employee in plant fire and
explosion).
100. For a discussion of each case, see The National Safe Workplace Institute,
supra note 9.
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Some of the most recent corporate homicide cases arising
from job site fatalities illustrate the types of circumstances that
are giving rise to criminal charges. Note the aggravating cir-
cumstance in each case: supervisory or managerial level indi-
viduals are aware of the danger or safety violation and that
they fail to act on that knowledge.
A construction worker was killed in Los Angeles in July
1986 when the unshored trench he was working in col-
lapsed.l 0 ' The employee's supervisor was charged with one
felony count of involuntary manslaughter, plus several mis-
demeanor counts. The supervisor allegedly knew that the
walls of the trench had fallen previously and that the shor-
ing equipment used was inadequate. 0 2
In another Los Angeles case, a building owner and unli-
censed contractor were also charged with involuntary man-
slaughter in the death of one construction worker and
serious injury of another. 10 3 The accident happened when
a reinforced brick wall fell on the workers. The district at-
torney stated that the building owner "ignored at least four
separate warnings" regarding the safety of the wall includ-
ing one made just minutes before the accident. 10 4 Other
safety violations were also charged.
The corporation and corporate agents were charged with
second degree manslaughter and criminally negligent homi-
cide in a New York case where an employee died in a ware-
house fire.' 0 5 The company stored cloth at the warehouse
and bales blocked the emergency exits and fire escapes.
When the fire began the employee was unable to escape.
Many safety and building code violations were cited, lack of
a sprinkler system or fire control equipment. 10 6 The court
noted that the individual defendants were responsible for
the unsafe condition of the warehouse.1
0 7
The president of a California drilling company pleaded
no contest to involuntary manslaughter when an employee
became trapped in an elevator shaft and suffocated.' 0 8 The
101. District Attorney Files Charges After Two L.A. Jobsite Fatalities, 33 Constr. Lab. Rep.
(BNA) 641 (August 5, 1987).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. People v. Deitsch, 97 A.D.2d 327, 328, 470 N.Y.S.2d 158, 160 (1983).
106. Id. at 330-31, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 161-62.
107. Id. at 336, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 165.
108. Kahn, supra note 8, at 50 (discussing People v. Maggio).
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company had failed to test the oxygen level prior to sending
the worker down the shaft. He also was allowed down the
shaft without a safety harness. The employee began to have
difficulty breathing because of lack of oxygen in the shaft,
without the safety harness the employer could not get the
worker out, and because the shaft had not been properly
cased, they feared dropping an oxygen hose down the shaft
would dry out the walls and cause a cave-in.'
09
In another trench cave-in, in Texas, two construction
workers were killed due to improper shoring.I10 The two
employees were working at the bottom of a 27-foot deep
trench when the walls gave way. The officials of the com-
pany were charged with criminally negligent homicide. The
employer plead no contest and the president was sentenced
to six months in prison."' Homicide charges were also
brought after a separate trench cave-in accident in the Aus-
tin area. 1
2
A corporate officer in Wisconsin was charged with homi-
cide by reckless conduct in the death of an employee in an
explosion and fire at a fireworks plant." 13 The officer was
also the day-to-day manager of the plant. The complaint
alleged that the officer knew the company was operating
without a permit, in a building that did not meet state and
local safety requirements. The complaint alleged that the
officer had been convicted of six violations of safety ordi-
nances for conditions at a near-by plant, only three weeks
before. Moreover, the complaint alleged that the officer
had been warned of the dangerous conditions in the plant
before the explosion and that other safety violations ex-
isted, such as lack of safe means of escape and mishandling
of explosive materials."t 4
Despite the small volume of cases, the trend is clear. Local
prosecutors in Los Angeles County, Milwaukee County, and
Travis County, Texas (Austin) have instituted investigatory
teams that are routinely sent to the scene of every traumatic
109. Id. The District Attorney stated that the employee's death was "[c]aused by
willful cost-cutting violations of the law .. " Id.
110. Tasini, A Death at Work Can Put the Boss in Jail, BUSINESS WK., Mar. 2, 1987, at
37.
111. Id. at 37-38.
112. See Special Report, supra note 6, at 1133.
113. State ex rel. Cornellier v. Black, 144 Wis. 2d 745, 425 N.W.2d 21 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1988).
114. Id. at _,425 N.W.2d at 25-26.
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occupational death."l 5 A Los Angeles County Assistant Dis-
trict Attorney explained that this "roll-out" procedure was
necessary in order to secure the evidence necessary for crimi-
nal prosecution.1 6 In essence, they are treating every occupa-
tional death as a potential homicide. 1 7 One authority on
corporate criminal liability stated that this area of the law
"[ijnvolves crimes [committed] during the ordinary course of
doing business, where the motive is primarily greed or desper-
ation, and the beneficiary, if there is one, is the company, not
the individual. In that regard, a lot of these cases are no differ-
ent from such common street crimes as assault."" 8
The effect of this current prosecutorial wave remains to be
seen. Most commentators believe that criminal prosecution
will be used only in the most flagrant situations,1 9 and that
criminal liability will not become the preferred method to
sanction corporations for employee safety problems. 120 A Mil-
waukee County prosecutor stated that he is targeting compa-
nies and people "such as those in Film Recovery who know
they are creating a danger" and who are bent on "rapacious
exploitation of people in the workplace."' 121 Several commen-
tators believe the trend will be felt most heavily by small and
moderate-sized companies. 22 This is due to larger companies
generally being able to afford safety programs and training.
Larger companies are also protected by their pure bulk. The
simple fact of size can help limit the exposure of individual cor-
porations and corporate actors. One prosecutor stated that
"the longer the chain of command, the less likelihood that you
are going to be able to successfully prosecute."'' 23 At a mini-
mum, the current activity and accompanying press coverage
have helped sensitize prosecutors to the option of bringing
115. Special Report, supra, note 6, at 1132 (investigatory teams described as "roll
out" units); Middleton, supra note 6, at 1; Yohay & Dodge, supra note 38, at 197.
116. See Special Report, supra note 6, at 1132.
117. See id; Yohay & Dodge, supra note 38, at 197.
118. Kahn, supra note 8, at 46 (quoting William Maakestad, Associate Professor,
Western Illinois University).
119. See, e.g., id. at 47; A Murder Verdict Jolts Business, BUSINESS WK., July 1, 1985, at
24, 25.
120. A Murder Verdict Jolts Business, BuSINESS WK., July 1, 1985, at 25.
121. Special Report, supra note 6, at 1133.
122. Kahn, supra note 8, at 46.
123. Industrial Probes, supra note 92, at 8, col. 4.
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criminal homicide charges.' 24
C. Possible OSHA Preemption of Criminal Homicide
Prosecution for Jobsite Fatalities
OSHA is a highly specialized regulatory scheme through
which Congress declared its policy to "assure so far as possible
every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful
working conditions and to preserve our human resources."' 2 5
OSHA requires employers to provide a workplace "free from
recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death
or serious physical harm . ... "126 OSHA achieves the end of a
safe work environment through the use of a complex frame-
work of specific safety standards and regulations. OSHA pro-
vides for state involvement through a process which allows a
state to file for federal approval of OSHA state enforcement
plans.' 2 7
Violations of the OSHA standards may give rise to civil or
criminal penalties. 2 8 The civil penalties range up to one thou-
sand dollars for serious violations and up to ten thousand dol-
lars for willful or repeated violations. 29  The criminal
penalties include criminal fines'30 and a maximum of six
months imprisonment in cases of willful violations that cause
124. Id. at 8, col. 3.
125. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b).
126. Id. at § 654 (a)(1).
127. See id. at § 667 (b). Minnesota has an OSHA approved state enforcement
plan. MINN. STAT. § 182.65-182.675 (1988).
128. See id. at § 666 (a)-(e). Section 666 (a) assesses a maximum $10,000.00 civil
penalty for each "wilful or repeated" violation of §§ 654-655. Section 666 (b) pro-
vides that an employer shall be fined a civil penalty up to $1,000.00 for each citation
of a "serious" nature under § § 654-655. Section 666 (c) makes the $1,000 per cita-
tion optional if the violation of §§ 654 or 655 is not "serious".
Section 666 (d) provides optional additional penalties of $1,000.00 per day for
failure to correct a violation for which a citation has been issued.
Section 666 (e) mandates that an employer convicted of a § 655 violation which
resulted in the death of an employee shall be fined a maximum of $10,000 or be
imprisoned up to six months, or both. A second conviction under § 666 (e) doubles
the maximum first penalty.
See also Howell, Construction Site Accidents-How OSHA Affects Their Litigation, TRIAL,
Mar. 1985, p. 20; Levin, Crimes Against Employees: Substantive Criminal Sanctions Under the
Occupational Safety and Health Act, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 717, 735-36 (1977) (although
the evidence could have supported murder charges in some OSHA cases, OSHA's
lesser sanctions have resulted in only parole and/or fines).
129. 29 U.S.C. at § 666(a)-(b). See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
130. Id. The maximum fine is $250,000 for individuals and $500,000 for corpora-
tions, 18 U.S.C. § 3623 (a)-(b). See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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an employee death.'l3 The OSHA requirements, however, are
designed to promote compliance in order to prevent accidents,
rather than to establish a system of punishment once an acci-
dent has occurred.1
3 2
There is a difference of opinion among the states regarding
OSHA preemption, although the trend appears to be in favor
of preemption. Courts in Illinois, 3 3 Texas, 3 4 and Michigan' 3 5
have ruled that OSHA preempts a state from pursuing com-
mon law criminal prosecutions for workplace safety matters. A
court in Wisconsin, 3 6 however, has allowed criminal prosecu-
tions to go forward despite OSHA. Since this question re-
mains open, it is a primary defense for corporations charged
with homicide to argue that OSHA preempts state criminal
proceedings.
The strongest argument against preemption is found within
a section of the OSHA statute itself. Section 653(b)(4) reads in
part:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to supersede or in
any manner affect any workmen's compensation law or to
enlarge or diminish or affect in any other manner the com-
mon law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of employ-
ers and employees under any law with respect to injuries,
diseases, or death of employees arising out of, or in the
course of, employment. 17
131. 29 U.S.C. § 666(e). See also supra note 127 and accompanying text.
132. See Brickey, supra note 40, at 775. See also Note, Getting Away With Murder:
Federal OSHA Preemption of State Criminal Prosecutionsfor Industrial Accidents, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 535 (1987)(analyzing OSHA and proposing that preemption doctrine does not
foreclose state prosecution of injuries in the workplace under state criminal laws).
133. People v. Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., 157 Ill. App. 3d 797, 801, 510 N.E.2d
1173, 1175 (1987), appeal allowed, 116 Ill. 2d 564, 515 N.E.2d 115 (1987).
134. State v. Sabine Consolidated, Inc., 756 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988). See
also Texas Company, Firm Officials Given Maximum Fines in Trenching Deaths, 16 O.S.H.
Rep. (BNA) 1068 (March 11, 1987).
135. People v. Hegedus, 169 Mich. App. 62, 425 N.W.2d 729 (1988), cert. granted
169 Mich. App. 62, 429 N.W.2d 593 (1988). See also Slaberson, States are Toppling
Workplace-Injury Convictions, N.Y. Times, Sept.19, 1988, at 1.
136. State ex rel. Cornellier v. Black, 144 Wis. 2d 745, _, 425 N.W.2d 21, 24-25
(Ct. App. 1988).
137. 29 U.S.C. at § 653 (b)(4). Courts vary in their application of the statute, how-
ever. See, e.g., Hatcher v. Bullard Co., 39 Conn. Supp. 250, 477 A.2d 1035, 1037
(1984) (although OSHA violations occurred and although they may have been willful
or wanton, the court refused to allow the plaintiff's negligence suit and declared her
only remedy for the crane-operating death of plaintiff's husband was worker's com-
pensation); Wendland v. Ridgefield Const. Services, 184 Conn. 173, 175, 439 A.2d
954, 957 (1981)(a jury may not be instructed that violation of OSHA regulations
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In State ex rel. Cornellier v. Black, l3 8 for example, the defendant
argued that OSHA preempted the state's charge. Wisconsin
charged homicide by reckless conduct since the death of an
employee occurred during an explosion and fire at the fire-
works plant. The accident occurred because of a safety code
violation.' 3 9 Specifically, the defendant argued that OSHA
represents Congress' judgment that
the best means to provide for and enforce worker health
and safety is through a federally-administered program, and
that to achieve that goal Congress preempted the field, leav-
ing to the states only certain specified and limited areas of
legislative and regulatory concern. [Therefore,] to permit
the state to proceed with a criminal prosecution for em-
ployer action (or inaction) covered by the act would frus-
trate the intent of Congress .... 140
The court, however, disagreed, and held that OSHA does
not preempt state criminal prosecutions.' 4 1 In reaching this
conclusion the Wisconsin Court of Appeals relied upon the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Hillsborough County
v. Automated Medical Laboratories. 1
42
In Hillsborough, the Supreme Court stated that, under the
supremacy clause, 43 federal law may supersede state law in a
number of ways.' 44 For instance, in the absence of express lan-
guage, Congress' intent to preempt state law will be inferred in
certain circumstances:
Congress' intent to preempt all state law in a particular area
may be inferred where the scheme of federal regulation is
sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the infer-
ence that Congress "left no room" for supplementary state
constitutes negligence per se; such statutory violations may be considered as evi-
dence of negligence); Hebel v. Conrail, Inc., 475 N.E.2d 652, 658 (Ind. 1985)(abso-
lute or strict liability can not be imposed simply because an OSHA regulation has
been violated, such a violation is not sufficient evidence of negligence per se).
138. 144 Wis. 2d 745, 425 N.W.2d 21 (Ct. App. 1988).
139. Id. at -, 425 N.W.2d at 22-25. In Cornellier, an employee plugged a fan into
an outlet, it generated sparks which caused an explosion and fire, which killed an-
other employee. The defendant, Cornellier, the day-to-day manager of the business,
argued that OSHA preempted the state's charge of homicide by reckless conduct,
and further filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the sufficiency of the
criminal complaint to state probable cause. Id. at -, 425 N.W.2d at 21-22.
140. Id. at -, 425 N.W.2d at 23.
141. Id.
142. 471 U.S. 707 (1985).
143. U.S. CONST. art. IV, cl. 2.
144. 471 U.S. at 713.
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regulation. Pre-emption of a whole field also will be in-
ferred where the field is one in which "the federal interest is
so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to pre-
clude enforcement of state laws on the same subject."'
145
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals stated,
The party claiming preemption must demonstrate a con-
gressional purpose to supercede the historic police power
of the state .... But even when Congress may be said to
have manifested an intent to preempt state legislation in a
particular field, a state is not automatically stripped of all
authority to act in that area.'
4 6
The court further noted, "A state will not be deprived ofju-
risdiction over matters of exceptional local interest unless
there is a compelling congressional direction to desist from en-
forcing local law,"' 47 and that "few interests are as deeply
rooted in local feeling and responsibility as the concern for
protecting the public against crime."' 48 The court found that
Congress' preemptive intent, in section 653(b)(4) of OSHA,
was not "clear and manifest"'149 and held that federal OSHA
action and state enforcement of criminal laws are not
conflicting. 5o
The OSHA preemption issue was resolved differently in Peo-
ple v. Chicago Magnet Wire Corp. 11 This case arose when five
145. Id.
146. 144 Wis. 2d at -, 425 N.W.2d at 24.
147. Cornellier, 144 Wis. 2d at ,425 N.W.2d at 24 (citing Farmer v. Carpenters,
430 U.S. 290, 296-67 (1977)). The defendant in Cornellier argued that by the terms of
OSHA, it was Congress' intent to "preempt the entire field of injury or death in the
workplace." Id. Both the court and the state agreed that the federal OSHA plan
preempts "states from enacting and enforcing their own occupational and health
standards in the absence of prior federal approval... " Id. The court, however,
disagreed that it was congressional intent to preempt homicide prosecutions. Id.
The court further noted that there was no conflict between the Wisconsin Penal Code
and OSHA.
[C]ompliance with federal safety and health regulations is consistent ...
with the discharge of the state's duty to protect the lives of employees and
all other citizens, through enforcement of its criminal laws. Wisconsin is not
attempting to impose a penalty for violations of any safety regulations. It is
only attempting to impose the sanctions of the criminal code upon one who
allegedly caused the death of another person by reckless conduct. And the
fact that conduct may in some respects violate OSHA safety regulations
does not abridge the state's historic power to prosecute crimes.
Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at ,425 N.W.2d at 25.
151. 157 Ill. App. 3d 797, 510 N.E.2d 1173 (1987), rev'd, 126 Ill.2d 356, __ N.E.2d
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corporate officials were charged with aggravated battery and
reckless conduct for exposing employees to hazardous sub-
stances and unsafe working conditions.152 The lower court
dismissed the indictments on the grounds that OSHA pre-
empted the application of Illinois criminal law to the defend-
ant's conduct. 53 The state appealed. 154 The court phrased
the preemption question on appeal as "whether state criminal
prosecutions based on conditions in the workplace are pre-
empted by [OSHA]."'' 55
In Chicago Magnet Wire, the Illinois Appellate court over-
looked Congress' statement of intent in Section 653(b)(4) and
found that the determinative factor in the preemption issue
was the type of conduct the state was seeking to regulate. 56
Since OSHA and the state were trying to regulate the same
conduct, the Illinois court held that OSHA does not permit the
State to prosecute conduct or conditions in the workplace
under state criminal laws in so far as the conduct or conditions
are regulated by OSHA."' 157 The court held, however, that
[t]he State would not be foreclosed from applying its crimi-
nal laws in the workplace if the prosecution charged the de-
fendants with crimes not involving working conditions. The
conduct the state seeks to regulate here, however .... is
conduct related to working conditions now regulated by
OSHA. We therefore believe that the trial court properly
(1989). As this article was going to press, the Supreme Court of Illinois reversed
the Illinois court of Appeals and held that OSHA does not preempt state criminal
prosecutions for job related injuries or death. See Richards, Corporate Officials Ordered
to Face Criminal Trial for Worker Injuries, Wall St. J., Feb. 3, 1989, at B5.
152. Id. at 798-99, 510 N.E.2d at 1173-74.
153. Id. at 799, 510 N.E.2d at 1174.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 797, 510 N.E.2d at 1173. The corporate individuals were charged with
exposing the employees to federally regulated substances which were highly danger-
ous. Id. at 800, 510 N.E.2d at 1174.
156. Id. at 801, 510 N.E.2d at 1174. The court added,
[t]he State has expressed valid and legitimate concerns about the conse-
quences of preemption on its ability to control the activities of employers.
But Congress has evidenced an intent that criminal sanctions should not be
imposed for activities involving workplace health and safety .... [T]he view
that employers may be held criminally liable for workplace injuries or ill-
ness, regardless of their compliance with OSHA standards, would lead to
inconsistent prosecutions of regulatory violations throughout the states, a
result that Congress sought to preclude in enacting OSHA.
Id. at 802, 510 N.E.2d at 1175.
157. Id.
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found that the prosecutions were preempted. 158
In light of Congress' statement of intent to allow employees
to retain their state common law and statutory rights, the Illi-
nois Appellate Court's rationale for preemption is weak. That
the court failed to apply the precedential tests for implying
Congressional preemptive intent further weakens its position.
A bill was introduced for consideration by the United States
Senate in which Congress' intent that OSHA would not pre-
empt local criminal prosecutions would be clarified. 159 In ad-
dition, the United States Department of Justice recently wrote
a letter to the House Committee on Government Operations
stating that there is "nothing in the OSH Act or its legislative
history which indicates that Congress intended for the rela-
tively limited criminal penalties provided by the Act to deprive
employees of the protection provided by state criminal laws of
general applicability." 160 However, at least for the time being,
preemption will remain a defense for corporations and individ-
ual corporate actors charged with criminal conduct in work-
place fatalities and injuries.
1 6'
III. CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR HOMICIDE IN
MINNESOTA: COULD IT HAPPEN HERE?
The current wave of corporate criminal indictments for
workplace fatalities has not yet hit Minnesota. There are no
reported state prosecutions of corporate criminals for on-the-
job deaths. Because of Minnesota case law on corporate crimi-
nal liability and state homicide statutes, however, the door is
open for officials to pursue corporate homicide prosecutions
158. Id. at 802, 510 N.E.2d at 1176. The Supreme Court of Illinois will hear the
case on appeal, 116 Ili.2d 564, 515 N.E.2d 115 (1987). The case may well be ap-
pealed to the United States Supreme Court. The result of this case may determine
whether the murder convictions of the Film Recovery System agents will stand.
159. S. REP. No. 2518, 100th Cong. 2d Sess. (1988). Hearings were held and
several state and local prosecutors urged that, if OSHA will not prosecute criminal
violations, states must be allowed to. See Amendment Of Law to Remove Preemption As
Barrier to State's Actions Urged at Hearing, 17 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 1395 (Feb. 10, 1988).
160. Justice Department Says OSH Act Does Not Preempt State Criminal Laws, 18 O.S.H.
Rep. (BNA) 1371 (Dec. 16, 1988). Several state prosecutors applauded the letter and
the fact that the Department ofJustice took a stand on the preemption issue. State
Prosecutors Welcome DOJ Stand on Preemption, Prepare To File Letter, 18 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA)
1396 (Dec. 21, 1988).
161. For additional discussion of preemption and OSHA, see Brickey, supra note
40, at 782-83, n. 163.
(Vol. 15
28
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [1989], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol15/iss2/1
CORPORATE HOMICIDE
here. 62
A. Review of Corporate Criminal Liability in Minnesota
Minnesota case law allows corporate entities to be held crim-
inally liable.' 63 The first case to discuss the issue, State v. Min-
neapolis Milk Co. , 64was decided in 1913. The decision did not
question whether a corporation could be criminally liable, but
rather whether a corporation could be criminally liable under
one particular Minnesota statute. 65 Six corporations and a
number of individuals were indicted under a state statute for
conspiring to raise the price of milk and cream. 166 The statute
provided for a civil penalty, forfeiture of the corporate charter,
and criminal penalties. 167 The court ruled, based on the statu-
tory language, that the criminal provisions could not be en-
forced against a corporation.1
6 8
The next year, in State v. People's Ice Co. ,169 the Minnesota
Supreme Court endorsed the notion of holding corporations
vicariously liable for the acts of corporate employees and
agents. The court stated, "The acts of the agents and repre-
sentatives upon whom the company devolves the duty of deal-
ing with the public in its behalf, committed in the performance
of such duties, are properly deemed to be the acts of the com-
pany."' 70 The court continued and reasoned that "[i]f the
company can absolve itself from liability for their acts by show-
ing that such acts were contrary to the general rules and in-
structions of the company, it would greatly increase the facility
162. The Minnesota Attorney General's Office has been following the develop-
ment of this issue across the country. According to an Assistant Attorney General,
criminal prosecutions by Minnesota's OSHA division will occur in the future. They
are currently exploring the means and mechanisms for pursuing such prosecutions.
Telephone Interview with Nancy Teppink, Assistant Attorney General, in St. Paul,
Minnesota (January 25, 1989).
163. See infra notes 165-99 and accompanying text. See also 4B DUNNELL MINN.
DIGEST 2D Corporations § 13.00 (3d ed. 1987).
164. 124 Minn. 34, 144 N.W. 417 (1913).
165. Id. at 36, 144 N.W. 417.
166. Id. at 37, 144 N.W. at 418.
167. Id. at 38, 144 N.W. at 418 (the criminal penalties were in a different section
from the civil).
168. Id. at 39, 144 N.W. at 419.
169. 124 Minn. 307, 144 N.W. 962 (1914)(corporation was held liable for em-
ployer giving short weight on the sale of ice to customers, despite their contrary
orders to give full weight).
170. Id. at 313, 144 N.W. at 965 (citing New York Cent. & Hudson River RR. v.
United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909)).
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with which a principal, through his servants, could evade the
law."' 17' Because the main issue involved a statutory violation,
the court did not confront the issue of intent.172
Minnesota courts have been very clear that the corporate en-
tity may not shield individuals from personal liability for crimi-
nal conduct. In an early statement on the subject, the
Minnesota Supreme Court said, in State v. McBride,173
[i]t is the universal rule that an officer or agent of a corpora-
tion cannot avoid responsibility for his act on the ground
that it was done in his official capacity, nor can he assert that
acts in corporate form are not his acts merely because they
are carried on by him through the instrumentality of the
corporation which he controls and dominates and which he
has employed for that purpose. 1
74
In McBride, the president and an employee of the corpora-
tion were convicted of selling liquor without a license in viola-
tion of a city ordinance. In his defense, the president stressed
that he should not be liable because he was not present when
the employee made the sale.' 75 The court stated that the cor-
porate officer "overlooks the fact that he employed [the em-
ployee] and controlled and supervised his activities."'' 76 The
court noted that there "was substantial reason" for believing
the president was "attempting to use a corporate legal entity as
a shield of protection for himself in his unlawful activity of sell-
ing liquor."' 177 Finding that the president had aided and abet-
ted the unlawful liquor sales, the court sustained the
conviction. 17
8
As recently as 1982, two corporate officers/defendants ar-
gued that "they could not be held criminally liable because the
corporation had issued the checks" which gave rise to the pros-
171. Id. at 313, 144 N.W. at 965.
172. Id. at 314, 144 N.W. at 965.
173. 215 Minn. 123, 9 N.W.2d 416 (1943)(the president and an employee of a
corporation illegally sold liquor through a corporation, the sale through the corpora-
tion could not shield the defendants from personal liability for the individuals' acts).
174. Id. at 131, 9 N.W.2d at 420.
175. Id. at 128, 9 N.W.2d at 419.
176. Id. at 130, 9 N.W.2d at 420.
177. Id.
178. Id. See also State v. Strimling, 265 N.W.2d 423 (Minn. 1978)(upholding con-
viction of officer of nursing home as aider and abettor of diversion of corporate as-
sets in violation of state statute); State v. Lux, 235 Minn. 181, 50 N.W.2d 290
(195 l)(upheld conviction of president of company as aider and abettor of seed sales
in violation of state statute).
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ecution. 79 In State v. Williams,' 80 the court followed McBride
and held again that the corporate entity would not shield the
officers from criminal liability.' 8 '
The Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in State v. Christy
Pontiac-GMC,I8 2 overcomes the two remaining barriers to cor-
porate criminal liability for homicide: whether under Minne-
sota law a corporation is a person, and whether a corporation
can be held criminally liable for a specific intent crime. The
Christy case involved a corporation charged with theft by swin-
dle after a middle-level management employee forged cash re-
bate applications. The corporation argued that a corporation
could not be held criminally liable for theft by swindle because
it is a specific intent crime. l83 Minnesota defines theft by swin-
dle as "whoever" falsely makes or alters a writing with intent to
defraud. 8 4 Justice Simonett, writing for the Minnesota
Supreme Court, stated that "whoever" refers to persons, and
the term "persons" as defined in the statute may include
corporations. 185
Because "[t]he legislature had not expressly excluded corpo-
rations from criminal liability,"' 8 6 the court reasoned the legis-
lature's "intent to be that corporations are to be considered
persons within the meaning of the code in the absence of any
clear indication to the contrary."' 8 7 The defendant argued
that, because the statute allowed for imprisonment for this vio-
lation and a corporation could not be imprisoned, the legisla-
tive intent must have been for the statute to apply only to
natural persons. The court was not persuaded and noted that
the crime allowed punishment that may include imprisonment
or a fine. The court, therefore, overcame the statutory inter-
pretation question and held that a corporation was a person
179. State v. Williams, 324 N.W.2d 154, 157 (Minn. 1982)(the defendants were
the sole owners, operators and officers of the corporation, the corporation issued a
check drawn on an account with insufficient funds, the defendants were held person-
ally liable).
180. 324 N.W.2d 154.
181. Id. at 156.
182. 354 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. 1984).
183. Id. at 18.
184. MINN. STAT. § 609.52, subd. 2 (1986).
185. MINN. STAT. § 645.44, subd. 7 (1982) (this is the same definition of person
that applies to the Minnesota homicide statute).
186. Christy, 354 N.W.2d at 19.
187. Id.
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for the purposes of criminal violation of the statute. 88
The defendant in Christy also argued the issue of whether a
corporation could be held liable for a crime requiring specific
intent. Christy claimed that the corporation, as an "artificial
person" could not "entertain a mental state, let alone have the
specific intent required for theft or forgery."189 The court
responded:
There was a time when the law, in its logic, declared that a
legal fiction could not be a person for purposes of criminal
liability, at least with respect to offenses involving specific
intent, but that time is gone. If a corporation can be liable
in civil tort for both actual and punitive damages for libel,
assault and battery, or fraud, it would seem it may also be
criminally liable for conduct requiring specific intent. ...
Particularly apt candidates for corporate criminality are
types of crime, like theft by swindle and forgery, which
often occur in a business setting. 190
The court went on to consider the evidentiary basis neces-
sary to hold a corporation liable for a specific intent crime
committed by its agent. For a corporation to be vicariously lia-
ble for a crime, the crime "must not be a personal aberration
of an employee acting on his own; the criminal activity must, in
some sense, reflect corporate policy so that it is fair to say that
the activity was the activity of the corporation."' 19'
The court set out a three stage analysis of the proof neces-
sary to convict a corporation of a specific intent crime commit-
ted by its agent. First, the agent must have been acting within
the scope of his or her employment, "having the authority to
act for the corporation with respect to the particular corporate
business which was conducted criminally."'' 92 Second, the
agent must have been acting in furtherance of the corpora-
tion's business interests.' 93 Thirdly, the court imposed one
additional requirement over those used for imputing criminal
liability for crimes not requiring specific intent: the illegal acts
must have been "authorized, tolerated, or ratified by corporate
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 19-20.
192. Id. at 20.
193. Id.
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management."1
94
The'court pointed out that the burden of proof for corpo-
rate liability is different than the burden for vicarious liability
for a civil tort. The last stage goes beyond what would be re-
quired in a civil suit.
What must be shown is that from all the facts and circum-
stances, those in positions of managerial authority or re-
sponsibility acted or failed to act in such a manner that the
criminal activity reflects corporate policy, and it can be said,
therefore, that the criminal act was authorized or tolerated
or ratified by the corporation.
195
Based on this analysis, the court upheld the criminal conviction
of the corporation.
96
Through this case law, Minnesota courts have already ad-
dressed and resolved many issues of corporate criminal liabil-
ity. A corporation may be vicariously liable for the criminal
acts of its agents. Individual corporate agents and employees
may also be personally liable for their criminal conduct be-
cause the corporate entity will not shield them. Moreover,
Minnesota statutes allow corporations to be treated as "per-
sons" for the purpose of criminal liability.' 97 By simply apply-
ing the precedents of McBride and Christy, Minnesota could
easily validate corporate liability for unintentional homicides.
Minnesota Courts, however, have gone further and possibly
laid the framework to allow corporate liability for degrees of
homicide requiring criminal intent.
B. Minnesota Homicide Statutes
The Minnesota Criminal Code has a five-tiered system for
homicide prosecution, ranging from unintentional killing by
culpable negligence to premeditated intentional killing. 198 At
least two of Minnesota's homicide degrees have the ready po-
tential for use in charging corporations with criminal responsi-
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 21.
197. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
198. See generally MINN. STAT. § 609.18-609.21 (1986 & Supp. 1988). Section
609.185, is entitled "Murder in the first degree"; § 609.19, entitled "Murder in the
second degree"; § 609.195, entitled "Murder in the third degree"; § 609.20, entitled
"Manslaughter in the first degree" and § 609.205, entitled "Manslaughter in the sec-
ond degree."
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bility in work-related deaths. 99
The Minnesota Criminal Code does not specifically include
corporations as possible criminal perpetrators, but instead in-
cludes a general definition of "person" in the "Interpretation
of Statutes" section of Minnesota Statutes. Minnesota Statute
§ 645.44 subdivision 7 states: " 'person' may extend and be
applied to bodies politic and corporate .. "2oo The criminal
code does not supplement or restrict this definition, thus, the
criminal code grants to a court the discretion to consider a cor-
poration a person in a given situation.
199. Corporations could be held liable under Minnesota's second degree Man-
slaughter statute, MINN. STAT. § 609. 205, and Minnesota's third degree murder stat-
ute, § 609.195. The other Minnesota Statutes would probably not be applicable to
corporate liability for homicide. First degree manslaughter, MINN. STAT. § 609.20
applies to killings where the actor (1) intentionally causes death in the heat of pas-
sion, (2) causes death while committing or attempting to commit a misdemeanor or
gross misdemeanor offense, (3) intentionally causes death because the actor is co-
erced by another, or (4) proximately causes death without intent by directly or indi-
rectly selling a controlled substance. These situations would not generally apply to
work site safety hazards that result in death.
Second degree murder, MINN. STAT. § 609.19, applies when the actor (1) inten-
tionally causes the death of another but without premeditation, or (2) unintentionally
causes death while committing or attempting to commit a felony offense. The latter
situation would clearly not apply to the corporate entity. Second degree murder in
the former circumstance requires intent to kill a particular person, or another via
transferred intent, so it is unlikely that the workplace fatality would give rise to this
charge.
In order for the corporation to be vicariously liable under Minnesota's second
degree murder statute, the actor's conduct would have to be both within the scope of
his or her employment and done to benefit the corporation. Using the Christy stan-
dards, the corporation would have had to authorize or condone the action. It is
highly unlikely that intentional killing of a particular person would be within anyone's
scope of employment, or that a corporate entity would ratify such action. Corporate
criminal liability for second degree murder is, therefore, remote. The individual ac-
tor, however, may well be personally liable. That was the result in the Film Recovery
Systems case where three corporate agents were convicted of murder, but the corpo-
ration itself was convicted of involuntary manslaughter.
First degree murder is defined in MINN. STAT. § 609.185 as (1) intentionally
causing the "death of a human being with premeditation" (2) causing death while
committing criminal sexual conduct, (3) causing death while committing one or more
specified felonies, or (4) causing death to a peace officer.
Like second degree murder, the statute requires the intent to kill a particular
individual. In addition, it adds the premeditation element. Premeditation is defined
as: "to consider, plan or prepare for, or determine, to commit, the referred to prior
to its commission." MINN. STAT. § 609.18 (1988). Again, because corporate criminal
liability requires the imputing of the criminal acts of an agent, acting within the scope
of his or her employment and to benefit the corporation, it is highly unlikely that a
corporation could be convicted of first degree murder.
200. MINN. STAT. § 645.44 subd. 7 (1986 & Supp. 1988) (emphasis added).
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Corporations could be held liable for Manslaughter in the
second degree. Manslaughter in the second degree is defined
in Minnesota as: "culpable negligence whereby the person
creates an unreasonable risk, and consciously takes chances of
causing death or great bodily harm to another. . ... 20i
Case law describes culpable negligence as "more than ...
ordinary negligence. It is more than gross negligence. It is
gross negligence coupled with the element of recklessness. '" 20 2
Another case defines culpable negligence as "intentional con-
duct .. .which the actor may not intend to be harmful but
which an ordinary and reasonably prudent man would recog-
nize as involving a strong probability of injury to others." 203
Manslaughter in the second degree is the type of homicide
with which a corporation is most likely to be charged in a work
site fatality situation. All of the reported corporate criminal
homicide cases across the country have been brought under
parallel criminal statutes. 20 4 The facts of the trench cave-in
case from Los Angeles20 5 may well fit into Minnesota's second
degree manslaughter definition. In the Los Angeles case, for
instance, a construction worker was killed when the walls of an
unshored trench collapsed. Culpable negligence could be
found because of evidence that the supervisor knew of earlier
cave-ins in that trench and knew that the shoring equipment
was inadequate.20 6 Knowledge of workplace dangers illus-
trates the second degree manslaughter element of conscious-
201. MINN. STAT. § 609.20, subd. 1 (1987).
202. State v. Spann, 289 Minn. 497, 499, 182 N.W.2d 873, 874-75 (1970) (cita-
tions omitted). See also 9 H. MCCARR, MINNESOTA PRACTICE, CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, § 1525 (West 1976 & Supp. 1985).
203. State v. Bejike, 267 Minn. 526, 534, 127 N.W.2d 516, 521 (1964).
The Criminal Jury Instruction Guide describes second degree manslaughter as:
Defendant... caused.., death.., by negligently creating an unreasonable
risk and consciously taking a chance of causing death or great bodily harm.
Great bodily harm means bodily injury which creates a high probability of
death, or which causes serious permanent disfigurement, or which causes a
permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily
member or organ or other serious bodily harm. The term negligence means
the doing of something which a reasonable person would not do, or the
failure to do something which a reasonable person would do under like
circumstances.
10 MINNESOTA PRACTICE, MINNESOTA JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES - CRIMINAL, § 11.24
(West 1985 & Supp. 1988).
204. See supra notes 39-67 and 87-96 and accompanying text.
205. See 33 Const. Lab. Rpt. (BNA) 641 (Aug. 5, 1987). See also supra notes 100-01
and accompanying text.
206. 33 Const. Lab. Rpt. (BNA) 641 (Aug. 5, 1987).
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ness, of deliberate disregard for the safety of the workers.
Similar factual situations could meet Minnesota's culpable neg-
ligence standard, and lead to holding a supervisor personally
liable. In the Los Angeles case, the supervisor was an em-
ployee of the corporation and was acting within the scope of
his job duties in overseeing the work. If there was evidence
that the supervisor was acting to benefit the company, for in-
stance, to save the company money or to keep the project on
schedule by not addressing the safety problem, then the crite-
ria for imputing the supervisor's conduct to the corporation
would be met.
The facts of State ex rel. Cornelier20 7 could also fit into Minne-
sota's definition of second degree manslaughter. In Cornellier,
an employee was killed in a fireworks plant explosion and
fire. 20 8 Cornellier was an officer and employee of the company
and was acting within the scope of his job duties as manager of
the plant. Culpable negligence could be found because of the
history of prior citations and warnings about hazardous condi-
tions in the plant.20 9 These prior citations and warnings lay
the ground to find the officer personally liable because of his
conscious disregard for the employee's safety. If it could be
shown that Cornellier was acting to benefit the corporation by
not remedying the safety hazards, then Cornellier's conduct
could be imputed to the corporation and the corporate entity
could be charged as well.
Theoretically, the other type of homicide for which a corpo-
ration could be charged is third degree murder. Minnesota de-
fines murder in the third degree as follows:
Whoever, without intent to effect the death of any person,
causes the death of another by perpetrating an act emi-
nently dangerous to others and evincing a depraved mind,
without regard for human life, is guilty of murder in the
third degree and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not
more than 25 years. 2 10
Third degree murder is generally applied to extremely reck-
less conduct. 2 1' A depraved mind is said to be evidenced by
207. 144 Wis. 2d 745, 425 N.W.2d 21 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988).
208. 144 Wis. 2d at , 425 N.W.2d at 22.
209. 144 Wis. 2d at ,425 N.W.2d at 25.
210. MINN. STAT. § 609.185 (1985 & Supp. 1988).
211. See MCCARR, supra note 198, at § 1523.
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extremely reckless conduct.2 12 It is more negligence than cul-
pable negligence, or negligence "so great as to satisfy the jury
that the accused had a wicked mind in the sense that he was
indifferent to the safety of others, reckless and careless
whether or not he caused the death of a human being." 213 The
extremely reckless conduct need not be directed at one partic-
ular person: third degree murder is intended "to cover cases
where the reckless, mischievous, or wanton acts of the accused
were committed without special regard to their effect on any
particular person or persons, but were committed with a reck-
less disregard of whether they injured one person or
another."2 1 4
The facts of the Film Recovery System2 15 case are the only
reported facts of a work site fatality in which the actions of a
corporation might rise to the level of third degree murder.
The fundamental business of the company required the use of
cyanide as part of their process. Company officials were well
versed in the dangers associated with cyanide. Numerous
safety hazards at the workplace were cited, involving the facil-
ity itself (such as lack of a proper ventilation system and sys-
tems for monitoring the level of cyanide gas in the air) and
failure to provide employees with proper safety equipment and
training. Company officials appeared to have deliberately
hired primarily illegal aliens who did not speak English and so
would be unlikely to protest the working conditions. Company
officials also allegedly took deliberate steps to conceal hazards
212. Id.
213. State v. Weltz, 155 Minn. 143, 145, 193 N.W. 42 (1923) ("to establish the
charge of murder, the act causing the death of another, and the circumstances attend-
ing it, may be prima facie evidence that the doer of the act was a man of depraved
mind").
214. State v. Lowe, 66 Minn. 296, 298, 68 N.W. 1094, 1095 (1896)("it is necessary
that a reckless act is committed without special design upon a particular person or
persons with whose murder the accused is charged").
The Minnesota Criminal Jury Instruction guide articulates third degree murder
as:
Defendant's . . .intentional act which caused ... death ... [and] was emi-
nently dangerous to human beings and was performed without regard for
human life. Such an act may not be specifically intended to cause death, and
may be without specific design on the particular person whose death oc-
curred, but it is committed in a reckless or wanton manner with the knowl-
edge that someone may be killed and with a heedless disregard of that
happening.
MINNESOTA JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDE, supra note 199, at § 11.18.
215. See supra notes 90-96, and accompanying text.
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from the employees. The dangers of cyanide, particularly
without proper safety precautions, could be found to be "emi-
nently dangerous." No particular person was the target of the
company's actions, but rather the pattern of conduct of the
company could be found to constitute reckless disregard of
someone's life.
Using the Christy analysis, in order for the agent's conduct to
be imputed to the corporation, the agent must be acting within
the general scope of his or her employment. One could argue
that the safety hazards at Film Recovery Systems were created
out of the policies of the company concerning facility and
workplace conditions which are certainly areas within the
scope of employment of the employees and officers charged.
Also, the conduct could easily be construed to have been done
for the benefit of the corporation, for instance, in order to
keep costs down. Finally, one could argue that the pervasive
pattern of safety hazards to which workers were exposed were
either authorized, tolerated or ratified by corporate manage-
ment. Indeed, it appears that individuals at the highest levels
of the company had knowledge of the hazardous working con-
ditions involved and tolerated them, if not affirmatively created
them.
Note, however, that conduct as flagrant and reckless as that
of Film Recovery Systems was not imputed to the corporate
entity. While three agents of the company were convicted of
murder, the corporation itself was charged and convicted only
of reckless conduct.
CONCLUSION
Pursuing corporate criminal liability for work site fatalities is
a needed check on corporations and employers. Prosecutors
have entered this territory as one way of filling a perceived gap
in work site safety protection. In each area of the country
where there has been a prosecution of a corporation for homi-
cide, it has required an egregious case to bring the issue of
serious work site safety violations to the prosecutor's attention.
Only then have the local prosecutors stepped in to help pro-
tect workers from jobsite hazards. As long as OSHA is per-
ceived to be ineffective in its enforcement efforts and grievous
situations such as that in the Film Recovery Systems case con-
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tinue, criminal prosecution of corporations under state homi-
cide statutes likely will also continue.
Corporate criminal homicide prosecutions should be seen
and used as supplementary to regulatory schemes for work-
place safety: as a "second line of defense" against the exposure
of employees to unacceptable hazards in the workplace. Used
in this way, corporate criminal homicide liability is not incon-
sistent or in conflict with OSHA or other regulatory schemes.
In addition, criminal penalties are not the most efficient or ef-
fective means of promoting or enforcing workplace safety stan-
dards, and should not come to replace vigorous enforcement
of OSHA and other workplace safety regulations.
For addressing grave situations like that of the Film Recov-
ery Systems, however, perhaps the punitive/deterrent ap-
proach of the criminal laws are more appropriate and effective
that the preventive/safety-standards approach of OSHA.
Criminal liability for homicide also imposes harsher penalties
on corporations than those offered by the civil and criminal
penalties available under OSHA and state OSHA programs.
Criminal liability, therefore, may be seen by corporations as
true punishment, rather than merely a cost of doing business.
The specter of criminal liability quickly and dramatically com-
municates to corporate decision-makers that safety abuses, if
not addressed by OSHA, will be addressed by local authorities.
Because of the inherent problems in making the case of cor-
porate liability for homicide, it is not likely that we see a flood
of corporate criminal indictments, in Minnesota or in any other
state. First, the corporation must be covered by the state stat-
ute on homicide as a potential criminal actor. Then the criteria
for imputing the conduct of agents to the corporation must be
met. For crimes involving specific intent, in Minnesota the
Christy element of corporate ratification would also need to be
found. These are difficult standards to meet.
All of the corporate homicide cases to date have involved the
imputation of the acts of corporate agents where there was
strong evidence of the agent's knowledge of significant hazards
in the workplace. In these cases, the issue was not general
knowledge of typical hazards that are part of the work (for in-
stance, the generally dangerous nature of construction work or
employment in a fireworks plant). In each case, the agent had
knowledge of the particular hazard that resulted in the em-
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ployer's death. Also in each case the agent, with some element
of consciousness, disregarded that hazard and the fatality re-
sulted. These are not cases of simple negligence: these are
cases of corporate agents consciously exposing employees to
known hazardous conditions. Under these circumstances,
bringing criminal sanctions against corporations is sound so-
cial policy.
Corporate criminal prosecution and conviction for homicide
for workplace fatalities could happen in Minnesota. And, theo-
retically, at least, corporate criminal liability may extend to
homicides requiring criminal intent as well. Even though cor-
porate criminal liability for homicide is still an extraordinary
means of addressing hazardous worksite conditions resulting
in fatalities, the seriousness of the sanctions and repercussions
emphasize the need for responsible safety programs and for
properly trained employees who will respond appropriately to
known hazards. By being willing and able to respond to on-
the-job safety hazards, a corporation should be able to safe-
guard itself from homicide liability.
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